Economic impact of unbundling regulatoin and deployment of broadband network in public utility economics by Nagamatsu, Toshifumi
Economic Impact of Unbundling Regulation and Deployment of 
Broadband Network in Public Utility Economics 
N agamatsu, Toshifumi 
1. Genealogy of the Traditional Theory of Industrial Organization 
I. I Harvard School 
Traditional telecommunications have spread through natural monopolies created by the 
application of public regulati9n, which balances supply and demand. However, rapid 
technological innovation has diminished the prevalence of the said natural monopolies, 
and the field of telecommunications has become increasingly reliant on the market 
mechanism. 
This paper refers to the revision of the Telecommunications Business Act, which 
has led to efforts to promote broadband through competition rather than public project 
regulation. Before analyzing the causes of the spread in the next chapter, I will examine 
the economic meaning of public project regulation, which has encouraged the spread of 
traditional telecommunications services in industrial organizations. This examination 
aims to show that traditional public project regulation based on economies of scale and 
natural monopolies will not be applicable to the promotion of broadband. 
In considering telecommunications as an industry, it will be necessary to make 
deliberations from the viewpoint of industrial organizations. The telecommunications 
business, which is the topic of this paper, is a network industry composed of energy 
businesses such as the electricity and gas industries, and transportation industries such as 
airlines and railways. 
Telecommunications will be studied herein as a network industry that differs from 
other industries because unique market principles operate within it. In this field, as 
reflected in the revision of the Telecommunications Business Act, technological 
innovation and distinctive industrial characteristics affect and change the mechanisms of 
compet1t10n. 
This makes it appropriate to consider the industry an industrial organization. The 
theory of industrial organization is greatly influenced by the political principles 
underlying the foundation of the United States of America (US), which are rooted in US 
society. This theory originates from the Sherman Antitrust Act, which was enacted in 
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1890 to target noncompetitive monopolies that undermine the spirit of democracy. 
This anti-monopolistic trend encouraged active involvement in economics by the 
government, and led to full-scale studies conducted from the viewpoint of industrial 
organizations. During the Great Depression, which was triggered by Black Thursday in 
1929, a massive number of smaller US businesses went bankrupt, and in 193 8, US 
President F. D. Roosevelt established the Temporary National Economic Committee 
(TNEC) in order to revive the economy. 
The TNEC submitted its final report in 1941, which clarified that the excessive 
concentration of economic power within the US economy was threatening the market 
mechanism based on free competition 1 Thus, studies of industrial organization began in 
the 1930s with E. S. Mason as the key figure, and the Harvard School, which was mainly 
composed of researchers from Harvard University, proceeded to theorize antitrust 
policies. 
Based on the idea that the market should be realistically recognized, they 
concluded that actual markets were not fully competitive, and .acknowledged the 
existence of monopolies. They also thought that actual markets were functioning as a 
combination of monopolies and complete competition. 
The Harvard School believed that a certain extent of interventional regulations 
were necessary in order to allow markets to operate properly, and struggled to discover 
means of eliminating market clout that derived from monopoly rather than competition in 
order to restore the functioning of market principles. In this regard, Tadao KONISHI 
presented the following observation 2. (Material within parentheses is translated by the 
author hereof.) 
Their [the Harvard School’s] anti-trust policy direction is more rock-ribbed than 
ever. To say nothing of [their] strict regulations on mergers and cartels, they argue 
that existing large enterprises must be split up in order to restore a competitive 
environment. And in the postwar era, anti-trust policies were based on the policy 
theory of this school and implemented strictly. This trend was at its peak probably 
around the latter half of the 1960s. 
In this way, the traditional theory of industrial organization was constructed by 
combining the economic approach of the Harvard School with antitrust policies. This 
theory was espoused by E. S. Mason and J. S. Bain, who advocated the Structure, 
Conduct, and Performance (SCP) paradigm and strongly maintained anti田monopolismas 
defined by the concentration-profits hypothesis 3. 
In order to explain the market economy, the Harvard School analyzed the scale 
of market performances according to structural requirements based on the concentration 
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of supply and demand. It argued that markets in which the concentration ratio is high 
would suffer extensively from a number of monopolies. 
It also contended that it is meaningless to regulate only corporate activities if the 
performances of a market are not good enough. In such cases, it said, structural measures 
need to be taken in order to change not only corporate activities, but also market 
structure. For this reason, it advocated structuralism as means to restore the functioning 
of the market mechanism. 
This concept was adopted in many places in the US as a structural regulation 
method aimed at regulating and eliminating the influences of monopolistic enterprises, 
and was developed with a focus on anti-cartel measures. A specific example of the 
outcomes of this adoption is the well崎knownbreakup of IBM in 1969. As for 
telecommunications as it relates to this paper, cases such as the breakup of the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in 1974 have also influenced industrial 
reorganization. 
1.2 The Rise of the Chicago School 
The Chicago School, which was mainly composed of researchers from Chicago 
University, disagreed with the Harvard School’s structural mode of thought that 
emphasized interventional regulations. The Chicago School emphasized the autonomy of 
the markets and their ability to adjust automatically, and expressed doubts about 
excessive interventional regulations. It was relatively optimistic about the functionality 
of the market mechanism and doubted that the negative effects of monopolies would last. 
Instead, it believed that monopolies may enjoy temporary success but will collapse 
eventually without sophisticated managerial methods. For example, if a monopolistic 
company is highly profitable, other companies will enter the market. If they do so 
quickly, the market mechanism will ultimately divest the monopolistic company of its 
monopoly, assuming that the company only relies on the advantages procured through 
said monopoly. 
So ran the argument of the Chicago School. In cases where a monopoly enjoys 
large profits not based on efficiency, other companies will enter the market and the 
monopoly’s profits will decrease to a competitive level. In other words, a monopoly that 
continually secures large profits is highly efficient. Therefore, if the structural 
approaches advocated by the Harvard School emphasize the market mechanism, they will 
not only have no positive effects on market白nctions,but will diminish the monopoly’s 
efficiency. 
Simply put, the difference between these two schools lies in the fact that the 
Harvard School adopts a structural viewpoint in its emphasis on the effect of market 
structure on market conduct, and that of market conduct on market performances in 
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contrast to Chicago School, which emphasizes the cause司and-effectdirection of “market 
structure→market conduct→market performances." 
Even if economies of scale are functioning and monopolies are inevitable, no 
industrial regulations by the government will make the market more efficient. On the 
contrary, government mtervention will artificially create a monopolistic market that 
seeks governmental protection and will lead to inefficiency. This is the conclusion of the 
Chicago School. 
The ideas of the two schools can be summarized as follows. The Harvard School 
considers large monopolistic companies an evil, and criticizes them for focusing on the 
increase of market concentration via noncompetitive means in order to earn excessive 
profits. Conversely, the Chicago School considers such monopolistic companies 
powerless in the market mechanism; therefore, it avers that the government should avoid 
intervening in the market frequently so that the market mechanism will not collapse. 
This paper is based on the idea that the principles applicable to the field of 
telecommunications cannot be derived from these traditional theories of industrial 
organization because the theories are too simple to describe today’s problems. Such 
theories or arguments between schools serve as textbooks for desk studies on basic 
economics, but are difficult to apply to today’s economic challenges. 
The issues that arise m modern industries as deregulation cannot be described as 
homogeneous phenomena on which the theories of the two schools are based. In 
particular, issues relating to the field of telecommunications require that we reckon with 
the interdisciplinary aspects of the field’s development, such as those relating to 
engineering or other technological factors. I will position these two schools within the 
sector of telecommunications, which I define as a unique industrial organization, in the 
following sections hereof. In addition, I will endeavor to formulate the necessary 
measures for establishing new industrial analysis methods in reference to the genealogy 
of theories of industrial organization. 
1.3 The Rise of the Post-Chicago School 
As mentioned above, the traditional theories of industrial organization are imperfect._The 
Harvard School’s approach reflects acknowledgement of a lack of competition in a 
mar孟etthat is not completely monopolized; however, it has failed to suggest a 
methodology for the empirical study of this lack of competition. In contrast, the Chicago 
School uses microeconomics in order to analyze the markets empirically, but its models 
are oversimplified. 
It only provides dualistic models of either monopoly or ful competition, and its 
explanations are weak. As these approaches of the theories of industrial organization to 
inadequately competitive markets progressed, game theory appeared on the scene, and 
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growing demand emerged for the establishment of methods based on microeconomics 
that would clarify strategic interdependence in the markets. 
Amid this transition, the limelight fel on new theories of industrial organization 
suggested by the Post-Chicago School, which was represented by key figures such as R. 
Schmalensee. This school was characterized by its possession of functions that 
compensated for the deficiencies of the traditional theories of industrial organization 
presented by the Harvard and Chicago Schools. In particular, researchers from the 
Post-Chicago School began to conduct empirical analyses of the application of 
anti-monopoly laws and its effects on the markets, which the structuralism of the 
Harvard School had failed to address. 
In summary, the Harvard School advocates the strict implementation of 
anti-monopoly measures to solve the problem of inadequate competition in the markets, 
the Chicago School advocates analyses using microeconomic models, and the 
Post-Chicago School tries to combine the strengths of the two in its construction of 
empirical analysis models. 
Schmalensee proposed that game theory should be treated as a model for policy 
application and applied to industrial organizations, since the theory can reasonably 
explain the pluralism of equation, bounded rationality, and the like, which had often been 
seen as problems in applying anti-monopoly laws. However, he would not state that game 
theory could explain al the problems in an industrial organization, which influenced 
subsequent research 4, 
Regarding the influence of the theory of industrial organization on economic 
measures in the US, Tatsuaki NISHIDA presented the following observation 5: 
International competitiveness of the USA in decline → Relaxation of the 
anti-trust policies advocated by the Harvard School → Confidence in 
auto・regulatorymechanism of the markets as advocated by the Chicago School → 
Reagan administration’s adoption of economic measures proposed by the Chicago 
School and recruitment of legal personnel from the school → Conception of 
“contestability theory" as mentioned hereinafter 
The high economic growth rates of Japan, China, the EU, and so on prompted the 
US to place importance on economic measures aimed at strengthening its international 
competitiveness in order to maintain a“strong America." This eventually led to the 
strengthening of the industrial organization, and during the 1980s, large-scale 
deregulation measures were implemented to boost the competitiveness of industry. 
In particular, the electricity, transportation, and telecommunications industries, 
which are known as the network industries, were starting to gain the recognition of a 
6 永松利文： EconomicImpact of Unbundling Regulation and Deplo戸nentof Broadband 
Network in Public Utility Economics 
number of other industries as an important network infrastructure, thanks to the 
development of science and technology. Therefore, enhancing the competitiveness of the 
network industries was considered an indirect requirement for enhancing the 
competitiveness of other industries. 
The role of the network industry is, as stated by Takanori IDA 6, to perform the 
connection function, which is one of the said industry’s characteristics and invests in it 
the responsibility of providing “the infrastructure for infrastructures.”Discussions of 
“network externality，＇’ which IDA presents as another role of the industry, are omitted 
herein, but the telecommunications industry will be researched in accordance with the 
theory of industrial organization. 
In the next sections, I will examine the applicability of contestability theory, 
which in theory supports the deregulation of the network industry. 
2. Conception and Application of Contestability Theory 
2.1 Contestability Theory in Terms of Industrial Organization 
Contestability theory was advocated by W. J. Baumol et al. In a completely contestable 
market 7, firms that drop out of the market bear considerably reduced sunk costs, and 
firms can enter or withdraw from the market freely and completely. Moreover, the 
structure of such a market does not have to be completely competitive. 
If new market players can minimize sunk costs (the costs of investment capital 
such as production equipment, research and development, publicity, and the like, which 
cannot be diverted to other uses), they will be encouraged to "hit and run." That is to say, 
they will enter the market seeking short-term profit, and abruptly withdraw from it 
before being counterattacked by other existing players. 
Kenichi FUKUMIYA made the following connection between traditional theories 
of industrial organization and contestability theory 8: 
Based on the concept of the completely contestable market and subadditivity of 
cost function, efficient industrial organizations will consist of advanced market 
structures involving natural monopoly . . . I demand that the linked paradigm of 
structure-conduct-performance, on which the traditional market analyses are based, 
be severed, and that the standard of application for the competition policies be 
revised. 
When contestability theory was developed, it was simultaneously expected to 
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solve the structural problems of both monopolistic enterprises and completely 
competitive markets in the industrial organization. At that time, as mentioned in the 
following sections hereof, privatizations and breakups of monopolistic enterprises in the 
US economy were proceeding on a deregulatory basis. 
However, contestability theory may not apply to the process in which the 
transport and electricity sectors, which are network industries, and the 
telecommunications sector, which is the subject of this paper, turned from natural 
monopoly toward the market system. 
The conception of contestability theory is linked to the global trend of 
deregulation that took place mainly in developed Western countries during and after the 
1970s. This trend was due to the collapse of Keynesian economic policies, and resulted 
in the streamlining of social systems through the reallocation of resources to draw upon 
private sector vitality and market competitiveness. A flock of network industries, 
including the telecommunications industry, rode this trend. Toru MURAKAMI referred 
to it as follows 9: 
The declining growth of productivity in and after the 1970s is partially attributed to 
government regulations, according to relevant sources. In addition, increasing 
regulations and regulatory expenses caused the government regulations to be 
reviewed, and the relaxation of these regulations and introduction of the element of 
competition were regarded as one of the important means for industrial 
revitalization .,. Appearance of alternative services in response to diversified 
demands for vatious services and technology innovation diminished the necessity of 
public supplies and caused the management of regulatory industries to deteriorate . 
The purposes of such reviews and relaxations of the government regulations are 
roughly classified into the following two factors .. The first is to reduce the range 
of government regulations in order to realize efficient administration and ease 
financial burdens.一.The second is to introduce the element of competition in order 
to vitalize private economy.... The above-mentioned purposes correspond to the 
following two matters, respectively. The first is the loss of natural monopoly 
accompanied by the change of circumstances as a result of failed regulations . 
[The second is the] appearance of alternative services in response to diversified 
demands and technological innovation. 
In this way, the network industries, including the telecommunications industry, 
experienced the privatization of main suppliers and the formation of competitive 
markets. 
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2.2 Contestability Theory and Telecommunications 
Since an enormous amount of fixed capital (installation and equipment) is required to 
supply traditional telecommunications services, social costs render it inefficient for a 
large number of companies to be engaged in the market. That is to say, i;t this type of 
industry, it is more efficient to allow only a single supplier to provide the service than to 
let several suppliers do so. Therefore, traditional telecommunications can be described as 
an industrial organization with a large extent of natural monopoly. 
Since the telecommunications and other network industries are almost public, 
natural monopoly was seen as the most appropriate way for them to provide services. In 
such industries, regulations to create the most appropriate form of resource allocation 
were imposed on businesses willing to enter or withdraw from the market, and fees and 
investment were also regulated to protect consumer benefits against excessive 











Figure 2.1. Markets Characterized by Natural Monopoly 
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As indicated by Figure 2.1, Q diminishes AC, indicating the emergence of 
economies of scale. This applies to al industries in which D < fixed costs. In such 
cases, the most efficient supply system is monopoly by a single enterprise. Realization of 
Qmc, at which P ＝ル1C,will constitute Pareto efficiency. 
If a company sets P at its own discretion in a market characterized by natural 
monopoly, P will satisfy the expression“MR =MC，＇’provided that the company intends 
to maximize profits. 
Therefore, under the same provision, P will equal P me→Pm and Q will equal Qmc 
→Qm. This generates a“dead load，”which indicates that natural monopoly has failed to 
efficiently allocate resources, and which could lead to market failure. The first step in 
preventing this will be to impose regulations on P and project approval, and streamline 
the market. 
However, this streamlining is based on the premise that supplies are sustainable, 
and differs from the concept of the market in a real sense. According to Figure 2.1, P = 
P me will be favorable to consumers, but will create a huge deficit for suppliers; 
consequently, the suppliers will not be able to stay in business. When P = P me, it is called 
theル1Cfee. 
When P equals Pac, it is called the AC fee, and it will only be favorable to 
consumers if suppliers maintain earlier levels of profits and expenses. To use fixed-line 
telephones as an example, basic charges will be based on fixed costs, and specific 
charges, which will be imposed on consumers for their actual use of the service, will be 
derived from MC, depending on individual suppliers. In such a scenario, suppliers will 
not suffer any deficit. 
In the 1960s, al US public industries, including the electricity, airlines, and 
telecommunications industries, were becoming increasingly inefficient, and doubts were 
raised concerning the existing regulations in these industries 10. 
Contestability theory as advocated by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig was aimed at 
relating these regulations to the characteristics of the public industries in order to 
theorize them. In the contestable markets on which this theory is based, suppliers have 
the following characteristics. 
First, they are released from sunk costs and free to enter or withdraw from the 
markets, and to maintain similar cost and demand functions. Second, existing market 
players will revise the charges imposed on newcomers after a certain time lag. 
In particular, since potential market entrants constantly monitor the excess profits of 
existing market enterprises, these enterprises cannot realize the profits and have no 
choice but to set AC fees at maximum levels in the aforementioned pricing procedure. If 
they succeed in generating an excessive amount of profit, new market players are able to 
enter the market abruptly, and withdraw from it before being counterattacked by existing 
enterprises. But what impact did this contestability have on the telecommunications 
industry?2.3 Contestable Markets and Natural Monopoly 
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Contestability theory is based on the concept of contestable markets. It argues that 
resources can be efficiently allocated in a contestable market even if the market is in the 
state of natural monopoly. 
According to this argument, natural monopoly generates the lowest possible fees, 
even though a single company controls the market. In this case, the entries of new market 
players will only lead to the division of product10n volume and increase total cost. In 
other words, the subadditivity of costs establishes the existence of natural monopoly. 
Subadditivity in the market is ordinarily proven by establishing equation (I). 
C(?:qJ < ?:C(qJ 
C: Cost 
q1: Production volume 
It may be necessary to explain how subadditivity relates to economies of scale. 
Economies of scale are frequently confused with natural monopoly, so an explanation of 
how the two compare in terms of subadditivity of cost is necessary in order to correctly 
comprehend the later. The explanation is as follows, with Figure 2.2: 
q1 qz q 
AC:Average cost 
。：Productionvolume 
q1: Arbitrary production volume (0く qiくり
q2:Arbitrary production volume (q1 < q2 < q) 
Figure 2.2: Economies of Scale 
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On the AC curve, economies of scale occur between zero and q. If q1 and q2a are 
between zero and q, they will establish equation (2). 
C匂!Yq1> C (q1jqz 。）
Here, q isdivided into two components, as expressed in equation (3). 
q=qa+qb (3) 
Since qa and qb are set between zero and qラ thetwo following equations are 
established. 
C(q'Jlq < C(%Yqa (4) 
C(q')lqく qb'Jlqb σ） 
Equations (4) and (5) are multiplied by qa and qb・
匂＇）q阿q）く C(qJ!qa 例
(q,jq照q)< C(qb'Jlqb （η 
C(q) < C(qa)+C(qb) (8) 
As equation (8) demonstrates, if economies of scale exist, subadditivity of cost, 
which is established in equation (9), will materialize. 
C（玄qi)<LC(q;) 。）
i=l i=l 
Since subadditivity of cost equals natural monopoly, natural monopoly will also 
eventuate in this market. 
However, if economies of scale do not exist, will subadditivity of cost? Figure 2.3 
shows the AC curves for cases in which there are only one or two players in the market, 
respectively. 
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AC(q): Average cost of production volume 
q:Arbitrary production volume 
q0:Arbitrary production volume (qo< q) 
2q0:Arbitrary production volume 
'lo 
Figure 2.3: Subadditivity of Cost and Economies of Scale 
Calculation of the cost of AC( q) for q is as indicated by equation ( 10): 
(10) 
If two companies are engaged in the production of q and each company produces 
half of the total volume of production, their costs will be as indicated by equation ( 1): 
q ・A({q) 
lfl.q • A({lfl.q）・2
Therefore, AC isindicated by equation (12): 
(12) 
The AC curve for equation (12) is produced by doubling the value of AC(q) on the 
x-axis, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
As shown herein, economies of scale occur at al points where AC(q) slopes 
downward. But at which part of the curve is subadditivity established? 
When there are only one or two companies, the portions of the AC curves for 
AO:lfl.q) 
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equation (12) where subadditivity takes place are the sections where the AC of the former 
case does not exceed that of the later. This would establish equation (13): 
AC(q）く AC（回q) (13) 
As indicated by equation (13), the range where natural monopoly is established is 
not identical to the range where economies of scale are established. Wherever economies 
of scale occur, so does subadditivity of cost. This means that economies of scale create 
natural monopoly, but not vice versa. 
We also need to examine the cost function in cases where two or more types of 
services are provided simultaneously after a single service (q) has been provided. In the 
field of telecommunications, for example, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public 
Corporation (NIT) was concurrently offering fixed telephone (q1) and wireless・ phone 
(q2) services. This situation is expressed in equations (14) and (15). 
C匂） (14) 
C(qi,q-}) (15) 
These are known as cost functions. Is subadditivity of cost present in such cases 
and, provided that Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation offers q1 and q2, 
what style of management will realize the most efficient total cost? In order to ascertain 
this, I will divide .service volume into the proportions αand p, and compare the costs the 
service incurs before and after the division. 
If the cost incurred after the division is larger, this telecommunications service 
features subadditivity of cost, as established in equation (16), and therefore possesses 
economies of scope. 
C(q1ラq－｝） くqαqi,均分＋Q(lー α恥（1一角会l
q1:Supply of certain products and services 
q2:Supply of certain products and services 
α：Proportion of q1 in supply 
p: Proportion of q2 in supply 




Since subadditivity of cost and economies of scope have been established, natural 
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monopoly is acceptable. 
2.4 Examination of Natural Monopoly in the Field of Telecommunications through 
Subadditivity of Cost 
Does natural monopoly exist in the field of telecommunications? If it is established that 
subadditivity of cost exists in the field of telecommunications, natural monopoly will be 
deemed acceptable and market competition denied. 
In the fixed telephone sector of the US telecommunications industry, the denial of 
subadditivity of cost and, subsequently, natural monopoly was triggered by the 
separation of AT&T, which offered local and long-distance phone cal services and will 
be referred to herein. D.S. Evans and J. J. Heckman referred to the breakup of AT&T and 
examined natural monopoly and subadditivity of cost in the field of telecommunications. 
Evans and Heckman examined subadditivity through estimation of the cost 
function. According to them, the detection of the division ratio, which showed that 
AT&T’s total cost was smaller before the separation than it was after, would prove that 
the cost was not minimized, subadditivity of cost was dismissed, and natural monopoly 
was denied. Therefore, the separation was acceptable because it enhanced social 
benefits 11 At that time, however, three companies (AT&T [Bell］，勘'lCICommunications 
Corporation, and Sprint) had already entered the long-distance communication market, 
and it is doubtful that the work of Evans and Heckman had much economic impact. 
Evans and Heckman’s work was used to support the vertical separation of AT&T. 
The three aforementioned companies were already players in the long-distance 
communication sector, and the market was thought to be contestable. As a result, Evans 
and Heckman did not find evidence of a natural monopoly, and this supports vertical 
separation 
However, Cooper and Sueyoshi later opposed it in their examination by using 
Operations Research 1 2 These argumentations then developed into a discussion of how 
cost function should be defined. Since the calculation of cost function, which is a 
precondition for the examination, has yet to be determined, quantitative analyses on 
natural monopoly are difficult to conduct. These would provide a basis for the separation 
of AT&T in terms of subadditivity of cost. 
2. 5 Criticisms of Contestability Theory and their Modern Significance 
There are problems concerning the way contestability theory has been applied to the 
separation of AT&T and liberalization of telecommunications. In case a market fails, the 
regulations, if implemented, are aimed at allocating resources efficiently and minimizing 
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costs. If these goals are achieved through natural monopoly, competition may not be 
necessary. This notion emphasizes the minimization of cost. 
But if the market is contestable, regulations are not necessary, and the market 
does not need to consist of more than one company. From the 1970s through to the 1980s, 
contestability theory was a popular theoretical basis for deregulation and liberalization. 
Its ’details are beyond the scope of this paper, since they are discussed by other 
researchers, but it is widely known that the liberalization of the US airline industry, 
which is a network industry, was based on the concept of contestability. 
In the end, contestability theory failed to confirm the assumption that there are no 
sunk costs. It became clear that it would be impossible to recover the cost of business 
operations using leased or used aircraft in order to facilitate withdrawal from the market, 
and contestability theory was dismissed. 
The theory is obviously weak, and its effectiveness has already been lost. In spite 
of its lack of theoretical strength, however, it possesses aspects that serve as a useful 
reference for the present-day deregulation of telecommunications. For one thing, 
although its presentation of sunk costs as an illusory element is not reliable per se, ・this 
notion indicates that the division of cost structure is possible through ownership 
classification, use rights, and the like. The traditional concept of fixed equipment 
integrates ownership and business use; therefore, in traditional telecommunications 
businesses, regulations have bee.n justified on the bases of economies of scale or 
economies of scope. 
With regard .to equipment-dependent industrial organizations, including network 
industries, contestability theory suggested the possibility of separating the cost structure 
by dividing ownership and equipment use rights. In addition, as IDA states, the creation 
of a contestable market would eliminate the need to regulate public businesses. This is an 
important pomt. 
In other words, since regulations for public businesses are based on the concept of 
natural monopoly and aimed at controlling corporate activities, a contestable market 
provides no bases for regulations because they are no longer・ needed. Consequently, IDA 
referred to this theory as a dynamic industrial policy and evaluated it positively for its 
unique approach to market structure. 
Contestability theory was not designed to address the need for structural 
separation in the present-day telecommunications sector. However, as mentioned below, 
competition for subscribers was important in the heyday of the Internet Protocol Suite 
(TCP/IP), and the combination of the broadcasting and telecommunications industries 
may result in the creation of a new industry. The business structure of this new industry 
has recently become a major policy issue, although it is not addressed herein; but for the 
aforementioned industrial spheres, contestability theory suggests a use釦1way of 
grasping structural separation. 
Amid the technological innovations achieved in the fields of information and 
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communication, present-day network industries, especially the telecommunications and 
broadcasting industries, are under pressure to review their industrial organizations. In 
addition to addressing the issue of ownership and use of equipment, contestability theory 
provides a basis for the possible separation of equipment structure. 
Contestability theory provides a similar competitive structure to that realized by 
the classification of equipment in access areas in accordance with unbundling regulation. 
However, as IDA states, contestability theory does not necessarily provide theoretical 
grounds for unbundling. 
3. Economic Effects of Unbundling Regulation 
3. I Unbundling in Telecommunications 
According to contestability theory, sunk costs in traditional telecommunications 
correspond to exclusivity in local communication networks. However, this argument has 
never been clarified. As observed herein, it was influenced by political interests, which 
resulted in the privatization and separation of existing businesses by sector, and the 
division of core networks into long-distance and local systems. Since economies of scale 
were based on the exclusivity of local networks, they could not be achieved by suppliers 
during the heyday of TCP/IP. Therefore, regulations on public businesses grew less and 
less necessary, and the opportunity to apply contestability theory was lost. 
The type of broadband examined herein is the network that constitutes the access 
areas consumers use in order to enjoy Internet services. It differs from traditional 
telecommunications in terms of importance. Broadband provided through alternative 
technologies, such as the digital subscriber line (DSL), cable television (CATV), and 
fiber to the home (FTTH) technologies, does not necessarily satisfy the conditions for 
sunk costs, so it cannot be analyzed using contestability theory. Further, the access areas, 
which formed a huge obstacle to entering the traditional telecommunications market, 
were opened up in the TCP/IP period, when the industrial structure that had monopolized 
these areas was transformed. 
Because of widespread Internet use, competition policies for telecommunications 
have changed, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications announced the 
New Competition Promotion Program 2010 in September 2006. This is a road map to lay 
down appropriate competition rules by 2010. The effectiveness of unbundling in the 
access areas will be judged by relevant demand and supply substitutions and studied in 
relation to the following conditions, which were suggested by J. A. Hausman and J. G. 
Sidak 13. 
Condition ①： Business A offers telecommunications services not only to Business B, but 
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also to consumers. 
Condition ②： Business B offers telecommunication services to consumers by using 
related services provided by Business A. 
(1) Business A can unbundle its network and provide Business B with technological 
connections. 
(2) Business A refuses to unbundle the network connections at a competitive or regulated 
service charge. 
(3) Business B is unable to construct its own network at a reasonable cost. 
( 4)Business A monopolizes the network m order to provide services to consumers. 
(5) Business A dominates the market by refusing to provide Business B with the network 
connections. 
According to Ida, conditions (I) to (4) are requisites to prevent competition, but 
not sufficient conditions. However, condition (5) is necessary and sufficient, and 
materializes if the profits of existing businesses increase through Small but Significant 
and Non-transitory Increases in Price (SSNIPs), as stipulated in the guidelines for 
mergers in 1992. If existing businesses implement SSNIPs and consumers switch to other 
services, the businesses will lose profits and SSNIPs will be avoided. As a result, the 
absolute dominance of existing businesses will be diminished. 
3.2 The Effects of Unbundling Regulations on ADSL Services 
This section examines the field of ADSL services. NTT East and West possess the 
network equipment necessary to attract subscribers and the dominant player in the 
market. Assuming that they provide ADSL services, what kinds of regulations will be 
required? 
NTT East and West correspond to Hausman and Sidak’s Business A, and are 
capable of operating and offering ADSL service independently, and providing Business B 
with the network equipment for subscribers. Business B is a type two carrier that does 
not possess the network for subscribers. If the network equipment belonging to NTT East 
and West satisfies the aforementioned conditions (1), (2), (3), and (4), the equipment will 
be absolutely necessary for a type two carrier that intends to provide ADSL services, and 
constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementation of regulations. 
However, electricity-related businesses possess their own equipment, so they will not 
require NTT’s equipment. 
As indicated by this example, regulations imposed on equipment vary depending 
on individual businesses, and NTT’s ability to dominate must be examined in order to 
found rules for the application of unbundling regulations on ADSL businesses. Suppose 
that NTT East and West set high charges for type two carriers to obtain a connection to 
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the network equipment for ADSL subscribers (such as fees for connection costs). The 
demand for ADSL services provided by type two carriers would decrease and the demand 
for services provided by NTT East and West would increase, resulting in an increase in 
profit for NTT East and West. In this case, the network equipment of NTT East and West 
(an existing business) for subscribers reduces demand for the services of other type two 
carriers, and increases the profits of NTT East and West. This is why, in the ADSL 
market, NTT East and West were obligated by unbundling re伊 lationto open up their 
network equipment for subscribers, and to do so in accordance with regulations based on 
SS NIP. 
The New Competition Promotion Program 2010 anticipates that 
telecommunications and broadcasting businesses with a horizontal industrial structure 
will become increasingly integrated, while those with the traditional service-providing 
structure in the layer structure classification will become progressively unclear, and are 
likely to undergo vertical integration. The aforementioned program addresses four core 
issues, of which the proper balance of equipment and service competition is related 
hereto. As mentioned above, the supply of broadband is divided into two categories: one 
in which the provider offers services with self-constructed facilities (equipment 
competition), the other in which the provider depends on other existing businesses for 
access equipment in order to o首erservices (service competition). Striking a balance 
between these two types of competition is an important matter. 
ADSL services have rapidly expanded among consumers due to service 
competition, which has been facilitated by unbundling regulation, and through utilization 
of the networks owned by existing businesses (NTT). Equipment investment by NTT 
East and West has also influenced the competition for the provision of FTTH services, 
the uptake of which shows an increase in the number of urban subscribers. That is, the 
balance between equipment and service competition also has a huge impact on 
competition in this sector. For example, equipment competition is effective in densely 
populated areas such as the national capital, but difficult and unlikely to succeed. in 
sparsely populated areas, where service competition is the only choice. However, 
investment efficiency in service competition is low for existing businesses, which makes 
it difficult to obligate them to open up the access areas of their optical fiber networks in 
a uniform way. 
3.3 Model of Market Analysis Based on SSNIP 
This section examines the model of market analysis created by Hausman, G. Leonard, 
and C. Vellturo, 14and the version adapted by Ida from that model 1 5,and applies them 
to the ADSL market. The existing business, Business A, is a verticalized 
telecommunications carrier that allows type two carriers to use its equipment and 
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provides direct services to consumers, and its market shall be referred to as the 
consumers market. The newcomer, Business B, is a vertically separated type two carrier 
and uses Business A's equipment to provide consumers with services, and its market shall 
be referred to as the B market. 
According to Hausman’s model, if Business A excludes profits obtained from the 
co占sumermarket (that is, if it only provides services to Business B), the critical market 
share at which its profits become equal before and after its charges are increased due to 
SSNIP is shown in expression (18): 
(18) 
い（） : Business A’s share of the consumers market I 
いα：Rateof fee increase in accordance with SSNIP I 
Mu : Business A’s ratio of marginal cost to fee in the B Market 
'lA : Elasticity of demand for Business A’services 
ηB : Elasticity of demand for Business B' services 
If the expressions Mu = 0.5, MD = 0.5，α ＝ 0.05，ηA ＝一0.5，ηB = 
-5 are substituted in equation (18), 8 ~ 0.707. According to Ida’s model, this means 
that if Business A's market share exceeds 70. 7%, it can increase its profits through 
raising its fees by 5%. On the contrary, if Business A’s market share does not exceed 
70. 7%, it cannot increase its profits by raising its fees by 5%. 
Ida further developed expression (18) and deduced the market power of existing 
Business A (a“verticalized company”） in the consumer market‘ 8 is Business A’s 
critical market share when its profits in both the B Market and the Consumer Market are 
included, and is calculated with expression ( 19): 
グミ 打 I＋町［(1＋α）：＝Mu] 
[(1＋α）－Mu ]('ls一弘）一（京一1)[1+ (1＋α）－1'/B] 
(19) 
According to Ida，λ｛D is Business Ns ratio of marginal service cost to fee, and 
事
if Business A’s share of the consumer market exceeds 8 , it can increase total profits by 
raising its fees. In this case, Business A is the dominant player in the market. If Business 
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A increases its profits by raising fees, 8 ~ ./)*, and the critical market share of a 
verticalized company will be smaller than that of a vertically separated company. In 
other words, Business A, a verticalized company, will be able to reduce critical market 
share by raising its fees and, therefore, its profits from the B and consumer markets, and 
will be more likely to exercise its market power 16. 
Hausman and Sidak’s five items, which are mentioned above, make it 
theoretically possible to propose this kind of examination, although the usefulness of this 
theory has not yet been confirmed. Nevertheless, it can be said that he integration of the 
broadcasting and telecommunications industries has exemplified the possibility of 
separating businesses either horizontally or vertically, including the option of dividing 
equipment structures through unbundling regulation, which was suggested by 
contestability theory. This possibility has stimulated competition in the ADSL market 
and encouraged the spread of broadband. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the economic roles played by public busine.ss regulations in 
traditional telecommunications. It has based its analysis on the revision of the 
.Telecommunications Business Act, which has encouraged the spread of broadband via a 
competitive system that does not rely on such regulations. 
Through this examination, I have tried to prove that traditional business 
re鋲Jlationsbased on theories involving economies of scale and natural monopoly are not 
applicable to the promotion of broadband. In addition to reviewing theories related to 
public business regulations before and after the liberalization of telecommunications, 
have also studied these theories for grounds related to the promotion of Broadband. 
Although the economic effectiveness of contestability theory has yet to be ascertained, 
its notion of separating the ownership and use rights of equipment structure should be 
reevaluated for present-day significance because it may provide clues to the issue of 
unbundling regulation. 
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